The mark of bodily ownership

Abstract : Do bodily sensations include a distinctive experience of the body as of one's own? I am aware that this hand is mine. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than beliefs or judgements? Bermudez (2011) and Martin (1995) have recently argued in favour of a deflationary account of the sense of ownership, according to which there is nothing it feels like to experience one's body as of one's own, no felt 'myness' that goes over and above the mere experience of one's bodily properties. Here I present a series of counter-arguments against the deflationary conception of ownership. First, I will argue that there are belief-independent illusions of ownership. Secondly, I will show that one can have bodily sensations with no sense of ownership. I will then conclude that the notion of 'experience of ownership' is a good explanatory tool to account for these borderline situations
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Article dans une revue
Analysis, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013, pp.643-651
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Contributeur : Frédérique De Vignemont <>
Soumis le : mercredi 30 octobre 2013 - 19:51:37
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 31 janvier 2014 - 06:40:17


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Frédérique De Vignemont. The mark of bodily ownership. Analysis, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013, pp.643-651. 〈ijn_00878770〉



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