Passive Consensus and Active Commitment in the Sciences

Abstract : Gilbert (2000) examined the issue of collective intentionality in science. Her paper consisted of a conceptual analysis of the negative role of collective belief, consensus, and joint commit-ment in science, with a brief discussion of a case study investigated by Thagard (1998a, 1998b). I argue that Gilbert’s concepts have to be refined to be empirically more relevant. Specifically, I distinguish between different kinds of joint commitments. I base my analysis on a close examination of Thagard’s example, the discovery of Helicobacter pylori, and two other historical cases involving the Copenhagen school of quantum mechanics and the Austri-an school of economics. I also argue that it is difficult to fulfill the condition of common knowledge, even in Gilbert’s weak sense. I conclude by raising serious doubts about the very possibility of a certain type of joint commitment which I refer to as an implicit joint commit-ment.
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Article dans une revue
Episteme, Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2010, 7, pp.185 - 197. 〈10.3366/E1742360010000936〉
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Alban Bouvier. Passive Consensus and Active Commitment in the Sciences. Episteme, Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2010, 7, pp.185 - 197. 〈10.3366/E1742360010000936〉. 〈ijn_01081440〉



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