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Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts?

Abstract : We examine how Frege's contrast between identity judgments of the forms " a=a " vs. " a=b " would fare in the special case where 'a' and 'b' are complex mental representations, and 'a' stands for an introspected 'I'-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call " one-shot thoughts " : they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the " a=a " form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let alone a priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos's objections against the setup of Frege's puzzle, while also raising what we think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and indexical thinking more generally), understood in their way, turns out to be incompatible with some basic features of rationality.
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Submitted on : Thursday, April 2, 2015 - 9:06:55 PM
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Billon Guillot 2014 - Can Freg...
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Alexandre Billon, Marie Guillot. Can Fregeans have 'I'-thoughts?. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, Luis Diego Cascante, 2014, Gottlob Frege’s Puzzle. A reexamination of the Cognitive Significance Phenomenon, LIII (136), pp.97-105. ⟨ijn_01138873⟩



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