Pragmatics, Mental Models and One Paradox of the Material Conditional

Abstract : Most instantiations of the inference 'y; so if x, y' seem intuitively odd, a phenomenon known as one of the paradoxes of the material conditional. A common explanation of the oddity, endorsed by Mental Model theory, is based on the intuition that the conclusion of the inference throws away semantic information. We build on this explanation to identify two joint conditions under which the inference becomes acceptable: (a) the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of asserting y; and (b) the speaker can reasonably be expected not to be in a position to assume that x is false. We show that this dual pragmatic criterion makes accurate predictions, and contrast it with the criterion defined by the mental model theory of conditionals, which we show to be inadequate.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Mind and Language, Wiley, 2011, 26 (2), pp.141-155
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [14 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger
Contributeur : Guy Politzer <>
Soumis le : vendredi 1 avril 2016 - 23:43:27
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 17:20:08
Document(s) archivé(s) le : dimanche 3 juillet 2016 - 12:22:22


11 Bonnefon Politzer ms M&L .p...
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)


  • HAL Id : ijn_01295435, version 1



Jean-François Bonnefon, Guy Politzer. Pragmatics, Mental Models and One Paradox of the Material Conditional. Mind and Language, Wiley, 2011, 26 (2), pp.141-155. 〈ijn_01295435〉



Consultations de la notice


Téléchargements de fichiers