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De Se Assertion

Abstract : De se attitudes, that is, attitudes that we have about ourselves in a first-personal way, have long been recognized as interestingly different from other attitudes. However, speech acts and, in particular, assertions that we make about ourselves have barely begun to draw philosophers' attention. This chapter discusses some recent proposals that aim to bridge the gap between the significance of the de se phenomena in thought and the way that we express those attitudes in language. Section 1 provides some background on the de se and the essential indexical. Section 2 surveys proposals that make use of centered contents in modeling assertion and communication. Section 3 discusses the main motivations for the idea that centered contents are not only the contents of de se attitudes, but also of the corresponding assertions.
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https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_01796641
Contributor : Isidora Stojanovic <>
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Isidora Stojanovic. De Se Assertion. Sanford Goldberg. The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics, Oxford University Press, 2018. ⟨ijn_01796641⟩

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