Peripersonal perception in action

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Peripersonal perception in action

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Abstract

Philosophy of perception is guilty of focusing on the perception of far space, neglecting the possibility that the perception of the space immediately surrounding the body, which is known as peripersonal space, displays different properties. Peripersonal space is the space in which the world is literally at hand for interaction. It is also the space in which the world can become threatening and dangerous, requiring protective behaviours. Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has yielded a vast array of discoveries on the multisensory and sensorimotor specificities of the processing of peripersonal space. Yet very little has been done on their philosophical implications. Here I will raise the following question: in what manner does the visual experience of a big rock close to my foot differ from the visual experience of the moon in the sky?

Keywords Peripersonal · Perception · Space · Body · Action · Pain · Affordance · Egocentric · Threat

Philosophy of perception has often been accused to analyse perception exclusively on the model of vision, but it is also frequently guilty of focusing on the perception of far space, neglecting the possibility that the perception of the space immediately surrounding the body, which is known as *peripersonal space*, displays different properties.¹ This neglect may be easily understandable insofar as we seem to be presented with a continuous visual field devoid of phenomenological boundary between what is close and what is far. Standard accounts of perception acknowledge the importance of the spatial relation between the subject and the perceived object by ascribing egocentric content to perceptual experiences, but the spatial relation is primarily spelled out in terms of direction (left, right, up and down, for instance), and not in terms of proximity. Yet recent research in cognitive neuroscience has yielded a vast array of discoveries on the multisensory and sensorimotor specificities of the processing of

¹ For exception, see for instance Ferretti (2016).

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peripersonal space. Here I will draw the philosophical implications of these findings and raise the following question: does seeing a big rock close to my foot differ from seeing the moon in the sky? As a first approximate answer, we can note the following: I can touch and manipulate the rock, but not the moon; I need to be able to immediately move away if the rock rolls towards me or to go around it if I am walking. More generally, peripersonal space is the space in which the world is literally at hand for interaction. It is also the space of immediate danger, requiring protective behaviours. It thus appears that whatever is perceived in peripersonal space is relevant for action. But how to characterize in details this relation to action? And is it specific to the perception of peripersonal space or can it also be true of the perception of far space? One may indeed reply that what is significant for the subject is not restricted to the space that immediately surrounds her. Seeing a lion thirty meters away has clearly an impact on my behaviour and I should not wait to react for the lion to be next to my body, when it is actually too late. In what sense, then, is the perception of peripersonal space unique?

1 Peripersonal perception

The hypothesis that there is something specific about the way we perceive the space surrounding our body has first appeared in ethology and in social psychology (Hediger 1950; Hall 1966). The boundaries of this spatial area are then defined exclusively in social terms and vary depending on the type of social interactions. As noted by the social psychologist Hall (1966, p. 10): “Each animal is surrounded by a series of bubbles or irregularly shaped balloons that serve to maintain proper spacing between individuals.” He then distinguishes between the intimate space, in which we can feel the warmth of another person’s body (up to 45 cm), the personal space, in which we can directly interact with the other (up to 1.2 m), the social space, in which we can work or meet together (up to 3.6 m), and the public space, in which we have no involvement with other people. Since then, others have proposed to differentiate the various “bubbles” by considering the different types of action that they enable. For instance, Cutting and Vishton (1995) distinguish between what they call the personal space, also known as the reaching space (Bartolo et al. 2014), the action space, in which we can move quickly and throw projectiles, and the vista space, which is beyond 30 meters. Although of great interest, most of these notions remain purely descriptive and there is a risk of infinite multiplications of these bubbles. It then seems more interesting to turn to cognitive neuroscience to determine whether the brain processes in any specific way the space close to us. As we shall see, numerous studies in monkeys and humans, both in healthy and pathological conditions, have found sensory and motor specificities of peripersonal space (for review see Brozzoli et al. 2012). We may then propose that there is such a thing, which we can call *peripersonal perception*, and which can be defined for now as the perception of the space close to the body. It consists neither in the perception of one’s own body nor in the perception of far space, but stands in between.

1.1 A multisensory signature

The first study was done on monkeys by Rizzolatti et al. (1981), who recorded the activity of neurons in the ventral premotor areas. They found that some were activated not only by tactile stimuli on the body, but also by visual stimuli presented in the space close to the body. They coined the term “peripersonal space” to refer to this spatial area, which extends from a few centimetres from the body to approximately 30 cm.² At the neural level, the proximity to the body is thus interpreted in a relatively narrow way: it corresponds only to the immediate surrounding.

Since Rizzolatti and his colleagues’ discovery of bimodal neurons, the main measure of peripersonal space has been the effect of visual and auditory perception on tactile perception. This multisensory signature of peripersonal perception is well illustrated by the cross-modal congruency effect. Participants are asked to perform a rapid discrimination of the location of a vibro-tactile stimulus presented either on the left or on the right index finger or thumb, while trying to ignore visual distractors presented simultaneously at either congruent or incongruent positions. Crucially, incongruent visual distractors interfere with tactile discrimination (i.e. participants are both slower and less accurate), but only when visual stimuli are close to the body (Spence et al. 2004).³ A similar multisensory effect can be found in the neuropsychological syndrome of tactile extinction after right-hemisphere lesions. These patients have no difficulty in processing an isolated tactile stimulus on their left hand but they are no longer aware of the touch when they are simultaneously touched on their right hand or crucially, when they see a visual stimulus *near* their right hand (Di Pellegrino et al. 1997).

Cross-modal effects are largely spread in perception in general but there is a notable difference here. Consider the famous McGurk effect: when the auditory stimulus/aba/is heard while looking at lips making movements that would produce the/aga/sound, one reports hearing/ada/. In this example, the auditory signal and the visual signal are assigned to the same source and they both carry verbal information. Their redundancy increases the robustness and reliability of the perceptual judgment based on their integration. The situation, however, is different in the cross-modal congruency effect. The flash of light is a distractor that has nothing to do with the small vibrator on the finger. Nonetheless, there is interaction because it is of interest for the perceptual system *to predict* what will happen soon in order to improve the processing of the forthcoming event (Engel et al. 2001; Hyvärinen and Poranen 1974). Specifically, the sight of objects close to one’s body generates expectation of a tactile event, which then influences the experience of the actual tactile stimulus. The perceptual system generates such a prediction because it expects either the body to move toward the object or the object to move toward the body. The predictive mechanism requires the location of objects and events close to the body to be encoded relative to the location

² For instance, Rizzolatti and coll. found that half of the bimodal neurons responded only when the visual stimulus was within 10 cm of the body surface while the rest fired mainly when the visual stimulus was within reach of the arm. Graziano and Cooke (2006), on the other hand, describe that half of the neurons gives a strong response only when the visual stimulus is within 5 cm of the body surface; and most of the rest give a response when the visual stimulus is within 20 cm of the body surface.

³ Similar multisensory effects have been found with auditory stimuli (Canzoneri et al. 2012).

of the various parts of the body, in what we may call bodily coordinates (or what others call somatotopic coordinates or skin-based coordinates), despite the fact that they occur in external space, that is, beyond the boundaries of the body.

Here it is important to clearly distinguish the bodily frame of reference from the egocentric one.⁴ They are both body-part centred but their bodily centres play different roles. Bodily coordinates are typically used in the tactile modality: the location of pressure is encoded as occurring at a specific spot in the surface of the body. Egocentric coordinates are typically used by vision and audition: the location of the object is encoded as occurring at a specific point relative to some axes (left, right, above, below) centred on some key parts of the body (such as the head or the torso). What is interesting is that within peripersonal space, vision can also use bodily coordinates, which do not necessarily coincide with the egocentric ones. Consider the following example. There is a ladybug on my right next to my right hand. The egocentric content of my visual experience is given relative to the posture of my head and of my torso and if I cross my hands, my visual experience stays the same: it still presents the ladybug on my right. By contrast, the bodily coordinates of the ladybug have changed: it was in my peri-right hand and it is now in my peri-left hand. Now imagine that the ladybug follows my right hand. Then the egocentric coordinates of my visual experience change (on my left), but not its bodily coordinates (in my peri-right hand).⁵ When a body part moves, what is perceived as occurring in its corresponding peri-space (such as the peri-head, the peri-torso, the peri-hand, and the peri-foot space) follows. As described by Graziano and Gross (1993, p. 107):

The visual space near the animal is represented as if it were a gelatinous medium surrounding the body, that deforms in a topology-preserving fashion whenever the head rotates or the limbs move. Such a map gives the location of the visual stimulus with respect to the body surface, in somatotopic coordinates.

From now on, I shall use this specificity of peripersonal space as its primary marker and offer the following working definition of peripersonal perception: peripersonal perception is the perception of objects and events that are localized in bodily coordinates despite being situated beyond the apparent boundaries of the body.⁶

⁴ It should be noted that there are more than one definition of the egocentric frame. For some, for instance, the egocentric space is simply the action space (Evans 1985; Briscoe 2009; Ferretti 2016; Smith 2009). On this view, one may then claim that peripersonal perception is encoded in egocentric coordinates. However, by using such a wide definition, one risks losing part of the spatial specificity of peripersonal perception.

⁵ The distinction is well illustrated in the cross-modal congruency effect. We just saw that when the hands are uncrossed, visual stimuli close to the left hand presented on the left side of the body affect tactile processing on the left hand. What happens when the hands are crossed? Then visual stimuli presented at the same egocentric location (on the left) but now close to the right hand affect tactile processing on the right hand. What matters is bodily location (left hand vs. right hand), and not egocentric location (on the left vs. on the right).

⁶ Two points are worth noting here. First, the definition does not assume that objects and events are encoded *exclusively* in bodily coordinates. Arguably, they are also encoded in egocentric coordinates. Secondly, by apparent bodily boundaries, I mean the boundaries of the body as they are mentally represented. For instance, amputees represent the space that surrounds their phantom limb as peripersonal but the phantom itself is not part of peripersonal space, it is part of their apparent bodily space.

1.2 Shortsighted vision

Most discussions on peripersonal space have focused on multisensory perception but what about *unimodal* perception? Is the only peculiarity of peripersonal vision its effect on touch? Or is it also characterized by specific visual capacities? We know that close objects are easier to detect and discriminate but is it simply because they are seen as bigger or is it because they are seen in peripersonal space? Recent experiments indicate that our perceptual abilities are different in close and in far space, independently of the perceived size.⁷

The first main effect is that object detection is improved: participants make fewer errors and are faster in judging of the appearance of a visual stimulus in close space (Dufour and Touzalin 2008; Reed et al. 2006). One may be tempted to explain this advantage in attentional terms. Reed et al. (2010) propose that peripersonal space is given an automatic attentional priority. There is no need to have additional cues to tell the perceptual system to attend to this spatial area; proximity is the cue. Such a priority can be easily explained by the fact that whatever occurs in this space has immediate implications for the subject, whether it is to grasp it or to avoid it. Immediacy here should be understood both spatially and temporally. There is indeed an emergency attached to it: one cannot wait to process the information. Since more resources are allocated, processing can be more efficient.

However, one may reply that we should pay less attention to what is close because it is *most* likely that we have seen it before when it was still in far space. If so, there is proximity but there is no novelty. Furthermore, if attention were increased in peripersonal space, then one should be better in all perceptual tasks and this is not the case. Peripersonal perception appears sometimes to be less efficient than the perception of far space. For instance, when participants are asked to localize a target among distractors, they are slower when the visual display is close than when it is far (Abrams et al. 2008). How can participants be bad at finding a target that is just under their nose? Since they are supposed to pay more attention to this area, they should be able to locate the target immediately but they do not. How is that possible? What this reveals is that perception must be especially thorough in peripersonal space (Abrams et al. 2008). One can afford not looking at all the objects for a far away visual scene but partial overlook may be dangerous when it is next to one's body. In a nutshell, you need to watch closely where you put your foot while walking in the Amazonian forest: a brief scan of the leaves does not suffice; you need to make sure that there is no hidden snake. In other words, better safe than sorry, no matter the cost.

What about object discrimination? The results there are also contrastive (see Goodhew et al. 2015 for review). In a nutshell, the processing of temporal and spatial properties is facilitated, whereas the processing of colour information and of fine-grained properties is impaired (Gozli et al. 2012; Kelly and Brockmole 2014). Even within the perception of spatial properties in peripersonal space, one can distinguish between global features, such as orientation and shape, that are better discriminated (Blini et al. in press; Kelly and Brockmole 2014), and local features, such as a small

⁷ The studies also control for the impact of other potential confounds. In brief, the effects cannot be explained by a higher visibility close to the hand, by the fact that participants give manual replies, or by the fact that viewing the hand attracts attention.

gap in a circle, that are more difficult to process (Gozli et al. 2012). This pattern of results may be partly explained by the hypothesis that peripersonal perception relies more on the dorsal stream of visual processing, which is involved in the guidance of basic actions, whereas the perception of far space relies more on the ventral stream dedicated to object identification (Milner and Goodale 2008). In particular, peripersonal perception may involve a specific type of magnocellular neurons, M-cells, which are sensitive to quick changes and motion and which have large receptive fields so that they can process the overall gist of a scene although they have poor spatial acuity (Goodhew et al. 2015). Interestingly, recent evidence shows that the dorsal stream also participates in object recognition (Freud et al. 2017).⁸

To summarize, peripersonal perception is not governed by the same computational principles as the perception of far space and its main peculiarities seem to be the direct consequence of its link with action. On the one hand, multisensory effects result from the anticipation of the contact with the perceived object, a contact that may follow one's movements (when grasping an object, for instance), or that may cause one to react (by avoiding an approaching bee). On the other hand, visual effects result from the significance of what is seen for planning one's actions, whether to interact with what is seen or to withdraw from it. If this is the right analysis of peripersonal perception, then one can make the following prediction: the alteration of one's motor capacities should have an impact on peripersonal perception. We shall now see that this prediction is confirmed.

1.3 What one perceives depends on what one can do

I shall now show that the extent to which objects and events are processed in the way that characterizes peripersonal perception is partly determined by the practical knowledge of one's actual motor capacities. In brief, peripersonal perception covers a smaller space when one can do less and a larger space when one can do more. Consider first the case of tool use. One can act on farther objects with a tool than without. This increased motor ability leads to a modification of perceptual processing of the objects that are next to the tool. Before tool use, they are processed as being in far space; during tool use they are processed as being peripersonal. This was first described by a seminal study by Iriki et al. (1996) who trained monkeys to use a rake to reach food placed too far to be reached without the tool. They found that visuo-tactile neurons, which displayed no visual response to food at this far location before training, began to display visual responses after training. A few minutes after tool use was interrupted, the visual receptive fields shrank back to their original size. Likewise, when amputees wear their functional prosthetic arm, their peripersonal perception stretches farther: the distance at which an auditory stimulus is able to affect the processing of a tactile stimulus applied on the stump is farther away from it than before (Canzoneri et al. 2013). Consider now cases in which the motor abilities are reduced. It has been shown that after 10 h of right arm immobilization there is a contraction of peripersonal space such that the distance at which an auditory stimulus was able to affect the processing of

⁸ For further discussion on the interaction between the ventral and the dorsal stream, see Briscoe (2009), Briscoe and Schwenkler (2015), and Matthen (2005).

a tactile stimulus was closer to the body than before (Bassolino et al. 2015). Along the same lines, it has been found that in participants who wear wrist weights peripersonal perception is narrower (Lourenco and Longo 2009).⁹

These studies reveal two interesting properties of peripersonal perception. First, the influence of motor capacities is *online*. The tool is just used a couple of minutes but this suffices to affect peripersonal perception and a few minutes after the tool is dropped, the effect stops. Peripersonal perception is constantly updated, determined at each instant by what one can do. These studies also reveal one mechanism that explains the strong malleability of peripersonal perception. Tools and prostheses have been shown to be integrated into the *body schema*, which consists in a sensorimotor representation of the body that is used to guide action (e.g., Cardinali et al. 2009; Canzoneri et al. 2013). Increasing (or diminishing) one's motor abilities affects the body schema, which in turn affects peripersonal perception. Peripersonal perception is thus directly influenced by the body schema. The practical knowledge of one's "here and now" motor abilities determines whether objects and events are processed as being peripersonal or not. This reinforces the hypothesis that there is a special link between peripersonal perception and action. We shall now specify in more detail this relationship.

2 The space within which the body acts

No matter how complex actions can be and how many sub-goals they can have, all bodily movements unfold in peripersonal space. While walking, the step is made in the peripersonal space of my foot and while I move forward, this peripersonal space follows. Actions are performed by a segment of the body within the space that immediately surrounds it. Their guidance thus depends on the constant fine-grained monitoring and remapping of peripersonal space while the movement is performed. It is then no surprise that when Rizzolatti et al. (1981) found for the first time bimodal neurons that encode peripersonal space, they interpreted their function in motor terms:

The discharge of neurons reflects a potential action, a motor schema, directed toward a particular spatial location (motor space). The presentation of a visual stimulus or the memory of its location, as in the new study, would evoke automatically one of these schemata, which, regardless of whether it is executed, maps the stimulus position in motor terms (...) movements progressively carve out a working space from undifferentiated visual information. (Rizzolatti et al. 1997, p. 191)

Peripersonal space is mainly represented in brain regions that are dedicated to action guidance (in the premotor areas and in the ventral section of the intraparietal sulcus). But how should one interpret this neuroscientific fact? What is the relation between peripersonal perception and action?

⁹ Lourenco and Longo (2009) assess the extent of peripersonal space by measuring a specific visual bias found only in peripersonal perception. When bisecting horizontal lines close to the body, individuals show a slight leftward bias, which shifts rightward when the line is presented in far space (Longo and Lourenco 2006). They found that individuals wearing wrist weights showed a less gradual rightward shift in the bias.

2.1 Neither too tight nor too loose

In the last section we saw that action determines peripersonal perception, to some extent at least. The question that we have now is in what manner peripersonal perception determines action. Their relationship can take more or less extreme forms. Let us, for instance, consider what Clark (2001) calls the assumption of experience-based control,¹⁰ which can be phrased as follows:

Conscious visual experience presents the world to the subject in a form appropriate for the control and guidance of fine-tuned, real world activity.

Even applied only to peripersonal perception only, and not to perception in general, this assumption seems to be too extreme in light of empirical dissociations between perception and action (Milner and Goodale 1995). One of the most recurrent empirical arguments against the role of perception for action comes from the neuropsychological dissociations between optic ataxia and visual agnosia. For example, the visual agnostic patient DF was presented with a set of various squares and rectangles. She was at chance when required to match the width of such simple geometrical forms but she was accurately able to grasp the blocks. The reverse pattern of performance was found in optic ataxic patients. The conclusion drawn from this double dissociation is that one can have visual experiences of an object without being able to act towards this object, and vice versa. Furthermore, it was repeatedly found in healthy individuals that action could be immune to visual illusions. For example, in the Hollow Face illusion, a concave (or hollow) mask of a face appears as a normal convex (or protruding) face, but if asked to quickly flick a magnet off the nose (as if it were a small insect), participants directed their finger movements to the actual location of the nose in the hollow face, which was 8 in. away from the location at which the nose appeared to be. In other words, the content of the visual experience of the face did not correspond to the visually-guided movements directed toward the face (Króliczak et al. 2006). This was taken as evidence in favour of the general model of vision according to which we have two functional streams of processing of visual information, the dorsal stream for visuomotor transformation and the ventral stream for visual awareness (Milner and Goodale 1995). What is interesting for the purpose of our discussion on peripersonal perception is that this dissociation occurred in peripersonal space: the face was displayed at less than 30 cm from the participants. Hence, even in the space close to us, the content of visual experiences (e.g., convex face) does not guide action-oriented vision (e.g., hollow face). Arguably, most action guidance is based on unconscious visuomotor processing of peripersonal space.

Still one should not take this type of dissociation as evidence that there are no interactions between peripersonal perception and action. Consider now the following version of a relatively weaker hypothesis, which Clark (2001) calls the assumption of experience-based selection:

¹⁰ In his paper 'Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight?', Clark (2001)'s discussion is on the relation between perception and action in general. Here I apply his way of framing the debate on peripersonal perception only. I shall consider differences with the perception of far space only in the next section.

Conscious visual experience presents the world to a subject in a form appropriate for the reason-and-memory based selection of actions.

The role of perceptual experiences is relatively modest on Clark's view, too modest, I would argue, to account for the special case of peripersonal perception. On this view indeed, perception remains relatively detached from the motor system. This can work when there is time. For instance, imagine that you are driving in Paris trying to reach the Eiffel tower, which is still far away on your left. This content gives you a rough indication of location you should be heading at and can be used by your spatial and practical reasoning (e.g., if it is there, that means that I should turn left at one point). It helps you in the selection of your itinerary but this takes place at the executive level, and not at the motor one. The time scale and the spatial scale are such that they cannot directly feed your motor system. I believe that one can be more ambitious in the case of peripersonal perception and propose that it can have a direct impact on the selection of action, instead of an indirect one:

Conscious visual experience presents *peripersonal space* to a subject in a form appropriate for the *motor selection* of actions.

Maravita et al. (2003, p. 531) define peripersonal space as the space "within which it [the body] can act". But one should probably add the space within which it can act *here and now*. Consequently, peripersonal perception cannot afford to be relatively detached from the motor system, at a more abstract level or in a different time frame. Roughly speaking, the motor system does not have the time for the reason-and-memory based selection. What is close to you in space can also be close to you in time, whether because you are approaching it or because it is approaching you. This is why peripersonal space is represented in a multisensory manner. And this is why whatever one sees in peripersonal space must be able to directly connect with what one does. Finally, as we saw earlier, for peripersonal perception to be of direct use by the motor system, it must be anchored in what one can do and it thus needs to keep track of the types of movements that one can actually perform at each moment.

However, this does not entail that peripersonal perception specifies the precise way actions are achieved. It contributes only at the level of the motor selection of the specific type of action. In Grush's (2007) terms, peripersonal content can give type-selecting dispositions, but not details-specifying dispositions.

A type-selecting disposition is something about the stimulus that motivates the execution of this or that behavior type, as opposed to nothing or some other behavior type. For instance, a bright flash might motivate a head turn and foveation, but not a grasp; an itch might motivate an arm and hand movement and scratch, but not any eye movement. A detail-specifying disposition is a disposition that, for any given behavior type (such as a grasp or foveation, or whatever), specifies the details of how that behavior type will be executed if it is executed. So for example will my intended grasp (behavior type) be implemented by moving my hand like this, or like that? (Grush 2007, p. 393)

Grush's distinction is important if one does not want peripersonal perception to fall back into Clark's experience-based control assumption. To make it clear, the hypothesis

is that the perception of the object close to us directly contributes in selecting the type of movement (arm withdrawal, for instance), but it not does provide the exact parameters on how to perform it.

2.2 Where are affordances?

Some may grant that peripersonal perception plays a type-selecting role at the motor level but deny that it is its exclusive privilege. Instead, they may argue that the perception of far space can play the same role and that one can perceive *everywhere* what has been called affordances, that is, dispositions or invitations to act. According to Gibson (1979), affordances are simply properties of objects, which somehow supervene on their physical properties. In brief, to be graspable is not to be close to a hand that can grasp but rather to “have opposite surfaces separated by a distance less than the span of the hand” (Gibson 1979, p. 133). It has been later suggested that affordances are relational properties (the object is graspable *for me*) (e.g., Chemero 2003). In favour of this view, one may cite a series of studies by Proffitt and his colleagues, which found that when participants wear heavy backpacks they overestimate the slope of a seen hill in front of them (Bhalla and Proffitt 1999). Proffitt’s hypothesis is that our physiological state at least partly determines our perception. The relation to the subject is then understood in terms of her abilities, and not of proximity: the hill is seen as climbable for me given the weight that I carry, but it is so wherever it is located. There is no temporal or spatial immediacy attached to the notions of affordances: the location at which objects are seen is simply irrelevant. On this view, perception in general can have action-oriented content. It then becomes more difficult to understand what privileged relation, if any, peripersonal perception has with action.

There is, however, a different interpretation of affordances.¹¹ For instance, Tucker and Ellis (1998) propose that I see the chair as sittable, or the pen as graspable, but only when the object is close to me. It does not entail that when it is far away I have no knowledge of what I can do with it. The hypothesis is *only* that my visual experiences present it in dispositional terms only when it is my immediate surrounding. This may seem in contradiction with Proffitt’s results but their interpretation is actually controversial. According to Durgin et al. (2009), the found effect does not result from the participants’ visual experiences but from their cognitive expectations about the experiment: the participants look for a reason of why they were asked to wear a backpack and relate it to their knowledge that climbing a hill is harder when carrying a heavy bag. Consequently, one can make the effect completely disappear if the experimenters give to the participants another explanation for wearing a backpack (e.g. “the backpack contained electromyographic equipment designed to measure their ankle muscles”). Furthermore, some other sensorimotor effects appear to be specific to peripersonal space, such as the stimulus–response compatibility effect. Here is an example of this effect. Participants are instructed to press a button either with their left hand or with their right hand depending on whether the object is upright or inverted. Motor responses are facilitated if the graspable part of the object (e.g. the handle of a

¹¹ There have been many interpretations of the notion of affordances (see Caiani 2013, for instance) but I will focus here only on this alternative.

saucepan) is aligned with the hand that responds. What is interesting is that the effect works only when the object is within peripersonal space (Costantini et al. 2010).

Where, then, can we perceive affordances? Eventually it may depend on the definition that one gives of the notion. What is crucial, I argue, is the kind of practical knowledge of one's abilities that is used. If one assumes that affordances ~~merely~~ consist only in what one can do with an object in general, or even what human beings can do, then their relation to action is relatively remote; they are connected to one's motor expertise based on a history of successful actions, but they are not directly connected to one's actual motor abilities and plans. There is no reason why practical knowledge of this kind should be restricted to the space upon which one can immediately act. Hence, if it is true that one can see such affordances, then one can see them relatively far away.

Alternatively, one can assume that affordances consist in what one can do *here and now* (as in stimulus–response compatibility effect). Their relation to action is then more direct and because it is more direct it is more likely to be specific to the perception of the space within which the body can act, to use Maravita's phrase. This latter definition of affordance is closer to Koffka's (1935) original notion of *demand character*, which inspired Gibson, or to Siegel's (2014) more recent notion of *experiential mandates*. For instance, Koffka describes that you feel that you *have to* insert the letter in the letterbox when you encounter one. One may assume that you do not experience the pull of such an attractive force when the letterbox is far. In brief, when you see it next to you, you feel that you have to mail your letter whereas when it is on the other side of the street, you do not feel it. One way to interpret Koffka's view is then to say that what he calls the "geographic environment" is the far space, whereas what he calls the "behavioural environment" is peripersonal space, and only the latter is organized by a field of forces (attractive or repulsive) between the objects and the agent. Consider now Siegel's examples. On her view, when you experience mandates, you experience not only solicitation, but also motivation to act: "From your point of view, the environment pulls actions out of you directly." (Siegel 2014, p. 53). For instance, some types of music invite you to dance and you feel you are mandated to respond to it. What rationalize your dancing are the properties of the music itself. Siegel proposes that the content of the experience is of the type: [it is answered that the music is to be danced]. She calls this content the answerability content. What is important here is that her notion of answerability is relatively strong. She wants to draw a distinction between the described case, in which you feel you have to answer to the call of music, and a different case, in which you simply feel invited to dance and you do not know whether you should do it or not. Only in the former case do you feel mandated; only in the former case does your perceptual experience *directly* motivate you to act on it. The difference here may be between seeing a piece of chocolate simply as eatable (that can be eaten), and seeing it as yummy (that should be eaten). Only in the latter is the relation to action is direct:

Experiencing <yummy>, the child is drawn to put more chocolate in its mouth. It is so drawn not as the result of some further cognitive or inferential step. None is needed (...) The present point is that no further cognitive step is necessary to mediate the connection between the content and the action in the case of <yummy/yucky> contents. (Cussins 2012, p. 24)

It then seems that most of Siegel's examples describe situations in which the subject can immediately act. For instance, she describes that you feel that you need to plop down on the bed because it looks fluffy and that you need to adjust your interlocutor's hair because it covers one eye. Can you experience such mandates when you see the bed or your interlocutor from far away? You may feel that the bed is inviting you, but not that you have to plop down on it. If we take seriously the answerability content that Siegel posits, then it seems that its background requirement is that one is actually in position to immediately answer it. She clearly states that the content cannot be simply [it is to be answered] because this is too prospective. It has to be [it is answered]. The hypothesis then is that one experiences a feeling of answerability when one takes oneself to be able to do something about it *here and now*. In other words, one experiences character demands when one is ready to act. This requirement is precisely what characterizes peripersonal perception.

3 The peripersonal demand hypothesis

Based on the analysis of the conditions to experience mandates, one may be tempted to defend the following view, which I call the peripersonal demand hypothesis:

One can experience mandates only when the seen property or object appears as being located in peripersonal space. The perception of far space does not normally present the subject with actions that she needs to answer to.

However, as we shall see, this hypothesis is too strong and I will suggest alternative versions that are more likely to succeed.

3.1 A matter of degrees

From now on I will put to test the peripersonal demand hypothesis by analysing a series of apparent counterexamples. Let us go back to Siegel's music scenario. It is a difficult case because the spatial content is not clear here. Still one may easily imagine that even if it is heard from far away, one can still feel the urge to dance. The question, however, is whether it is your auditory content on its own that makes you experience the need to answer the call of the music. It rather seems that there is an affective dimension here. In short, you love this music and the pleasure you have when listening to it pushes you to act. By contrast, the peripersonal demand hypothesis requires the perceptual content itself to have a motivational force. Interpreted this way, the music example does not invalidate the hypothesis. Let us then consider a non-affectively loaded example, based on a true story. The former French President Hollande had often his tie slightly tilted when he was on TV and many French citizens felt the urge to adjust it. Siegel might interpret such a case in terms of answerability: the spectators felt mandated to adjust the President's tie, although it was not within their reaching distance. Here again, it is possible to defend the peripersonal demand hypothesis. First, one may reply that although it is true that the spectators could not objectively touch the tie, they were under the spatial illusion that they could touch it. What they experienced would be

comparable to the startle reflex to draw away that one has when one sees something scary suddenly appearing on the screen. Alternatively, one may reply that what they experienced was only a desire based on their visual experience of the tilted tie. If this were the case, then the visual content had no motivational force on its own.¹²

Still one may argue that there are other cases in which one experiences the demand character of objects located beyond the immediate surrounding of one's body. Let us imagine, for instance, that you are in a construction site operating a power shovel. You then see that there is a steel bar ready to fall. You may then visually experience that you have to catch it, although the bar is at 10 m from your body. However, here I would argue that your visual experience is peripersonal and this is why it plays such a motivational role. Peripersonal space should not be understood in metric terms: it is not simply the area up to 30 cm surrounding the body. What is perceived as peripersonal space depends on a range of factors, and more specifically on motor ones. If for one reason or another (such as using a tool) one takes oneself to be able to immediately act on something, although it is relatively far away, one can represent it as being part of one's peripersonal space. Hence, the steel bar scenario does not constitute a counterexample to the peripersonal demand hypothesis.

There may be more cases in which it seems that one experiences a feeling of answerability for objects beyond the immediate surrounding of one's body but to argue that the peripersonal demand hypothesis is false, one would have to show (i) that one feels motivated because of the visual content itself, and not because of the emotions or the desire triggered by the visual content, and (ii) that one does not represent the space in which the objects are located as being peripersonal. The problem is that it may be sometimes difficult to disentangle between these various cases, and thus to positively assert that visual experiences for extrapersonal space can never have answerability content. One may then propose a relatively weak interpretation of the peripersonal demand hypothesis. On this version, the difference between the perception of far space and close space is not a matter of all or nothing but more of a continuum. Hall's (1969) notion of bubble is inaccurate because it entails a sharp boundary between what is inside the bubble and what is outside. Instead, one should talk of a *field* characterized by its gradient, similar to the magnetic field. One may then say that if it is true that one can experience mandates, then it is more likely to happen in the case of peripersonal perception than in the case of the perception of far space. Alternatively, one may claim that the feeling of answerability is experienced more vividly when objects are next to the subject but she can still experience it even for objects that are far. One may also suggest that they can be experienced with a stronger degree of urgency when they are close. The gradient hypothesis has probably some truth in it but it remains to understand the direction of the gradient: why is the force more powerful when the

¹² One way to settle the debate between the two interpretations is to determine whether the spectators displayed some kind of motor readiness to act. Arguably, there is a motor proxy to the feeling of answerability. When experiencing a mandate, one feels that one needs to act and doing nothing then is only inhibiting an urge to do something. This urge most probably results in some level of motor activity. In the music case, for example, when you feel that the music is calling you and that you have to dance, you may start making small rhythmic movements that you cannot help doing, not yet real dancing steps, but still something. If the spectators show no motor readiness to adjust the tie, even inhibited, it then means that they do not feel mandated to do it.

object is seen as close? I will propose that there is a fundamental difference between close space and far space beyond quantitative variations.

3.2 Semper paratus

We just saw that it is difficult to fully rule out the possibility that extrapersonal experiences can have answerability content. Neither does one want to claim that peripersonal experiences always have answerability content. Arguably, there are many cases in which one's environment is neutral and one does not feel mandated to do anything. Still, I argue, peripersonal perception does not have the same relationship to action as the perception of far space. The hypothesis that I will now defend is the following. In short, peripersonal perception specifically evolved for one to experience mandates, while this is not the case of the perception of far space. Mandates are present-directed: they are about what one has to do now. Feeling that one needs to answer to what one perceives implies feeling ready to do it. I will now argue that peripersonal perception is characterized by this readiness to act because it was designed for situations in which one has no choice but to act, namely, when one is under threat (Graziano 2009; Brozzoli et al. 2012).

It was the Swiss biologist Hediger (1950), director of the Zurich zoo, who actually first noted that animals do not process space uniformly and in particular that there is a specific zone immediately surrounding their body, described as the flight distance, that predators cannot approach without eliciting specific defensive responses (flight, freeze or fight depending on how close the predator is):

The satisfaction of hunger and sexual appetite can be postponed; not so escape from a dangerous enemy, and all animals, even the biggest and fiercest, have enemies. As far as higher animals are concerned, escape must thus at any rate be considered as the most important behavior biologically. (Hediger 1950, p 20)

Since Hediger, it has been generally accepted that peripersonal perception evolved as the perception of a margin of safety, which is encoded in a specific way to elicit protective behaviours as quickly as possible if necessary. For instance, it has been shown that direct electric stimulation of the bimodal neurons involved in peripersonal perception elicits protective responses. Less invasively, the perception of stimuli close to the body elicits avoidance behaviour (for review, Graziano 2009). In humans too, it has been shown that the perception of an intense sound near the hand can cause a defensive-like freeze response, resembling that observed during the presentation of noxious stimuli (Avenanti et al. 2012). Recent results in neuroimaging also show that when one perceives a salient stimulus close to one's body through vision or audition one activates the same brain areas as those that are activated when one is in pain (Legrain et al. 2011). Furthermore, it has been described that patients who suffer from pain asymbolia lack reaction not only to painful stimuli, but also to dangerous ones close to their body (Grahek 2001). It may then seem that the right evolutionary model to understand peripersonal perception can be found in the analysis of pain. At first sight, they have much in common. Peripersonal perception motivates protective behaviours and it justifies why we act in the way pain does. The perception of close threats is

clearly the most convincing example of mandates. If there is a time at which we really feel we have to do something is when a cobra snake gets close to us. Our perceptual experience of the snake next to our foot makes intelligible why we feel mandated to withdraw our foot. If we had perceived it far away from our body, we would not be able to justify why we moved in such a way. The rationalising property of protective responses in such a case consists in the peripersonal content.

I thus propose that the feeling of answerability is precisely the reason for which peripersonal perception evolved, while this is not the case for the perception of far space. Roughly speaking, only peripersonal perception was designed to follow the old Scout's motto: "Semper paratus". From an evolutionary perspective, peripersonal perception is always prepared to make one act because it originally evolved for the purpose of the detection of close threats and self-defence. From a neuroscientific perspective, peripersonal perception is always prepared to make one act thanks to its implementation within brain structures involved in action guidance. From a computational perspective, peripersonal perception is always prepared to make one act because it is informed by what one can and cannot do at each instant.

Nonetheless one may be tempted to reject even this qualified version of the peripersonal demand hypothesis on the ground that some threats need us to react very quickly even when they are still far away. As noted in the introduction, if I see a lion thirty meters away from me, I should feel mandated to do something about it (such as freeze or run). It would be already too late if the lion were only 30 cm away from me. This example, however, does not refute the new proposal. One may indeed argue that in the lion example, the source of the motivation that I experience is not to be found in the visual content itself but rather in the fear that I experience. If I were not afraid, I would most probably not react at all. But could one not offer the same analysis for peripersonal cases? When I see the snake close to my foot, there is no doubt that I am frightened by it and that my fear motivates me to avoid it. The crucial question is whether this is the only source of motivation that I have. It does not seem so. We saw earlier that defensive responses can be artificially induced simply by directly stimulating the brain areas involved in peripersonal perception (Graziano 2009). There is no fear experienced in such a situation and yet the monkey automatically engages in a range of protective behaviours. In order to show the motivational role of peripersonal perception per se, one can also look at less frightful scenarios. As argued, peripersonal perception evolved because of threats but fortunately we rarely meet snakes and other predators. Nonetheless, peripersonal perception constantly plays a motivational role in our everyday urban life. It is enough to navigate in a room full of furniture or in a street full of people. Seeing an obstacle such as a chair on one's path does not elicit a feeling of fear. Yet one avoids the chair. One leans away from visible objects, and, when walking through a doorway, one tilts one's shoulders to protect one's body from hitting the doorframe. The thing is that if one stops paying attention to peripersonal space, as this occurs in the neurological syndrome of peripersonal neglect, one collides more into objects (Nijboer et al. 2014).¹³ Peripersonal perception has an intrinsic

¹³ It is interesting to note that there is a three-fold dissociation between personal neglect (bodily space), peripersonal neglect, and extrapersonal neglect. Furthermore, a study that investigated the motor performance of monkeys after a lesion of their ventral premotor cortex (V6A), a cortical area responsible for

motivational force, which is not borrowed from fear. This allows a direct connection for action, which is literally vital when our body is under immediate threat.

4 Conclusion

There is a certain degree of emergency when it comes to peripersonal space, not as much as with pain, but still a lot more than with the rest of my perceptual field. This emergency and the necessity to always be ready for impact that follows from it raise a number of computational challenges specific to peripersonal perception. In this paper, we saw the sensory and motor specificities of peripersonal perception. To reply to the question we started with in the introduction, we can now reply positively: seeing the rock close to my foot does differ from seeing the moon in the sky. However, there are many questions that are still left unanswered. In particular, what kind of content do peripersonal experiences have? For sake of simplicity, I adopted Siegel's proposal of answerability content but one may wonder whether this is the right way to analyse the content of peripersonal experiences. Given the similarities between pain and threat perception highlighted earlier, one might wonder whether the theory that is true for pain may ~~not~~ also be true for peripersonal experiences, at least for those that are about threats.¹⁴ The challenge is then to understand how to spell out this content, whether it is of pain or of peripersonal experiences. Some argue that it is imperative (Klein 2015; Martínez 2011); others say that it is evaluative (Bain 2013). This debate goes beyond the present paper but it remains that the relation to action that pain entertains appears to be a promising path to explore the motivational force of peripersonal experiences. It further reveals that we are far from standard models of perceptual content.

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Footnote 13 continued
peripersonal perception, described that the monkeys started to hold their arm close to their body and refused to spontaneously move them (Battaglini et al. 2002). This may follow from the lack of conscious experience of their immediate surrounding.

¹⁴ Siegel (2014) herself suggests that the answerability content must have a valence.

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2.	Reference Hall (1969) was mentioned in the manuscript; however, this was not included in the reference list. As a rule, all mentioned references should be present in the reference list. Please provide the reference details to be inserted in the reference list.	I've changed it to 1966
3.	Please check and confirm the inserted funding information is correct in 'Acknowledgements'.	I've revised them.
4.	Please provide complete details for reference Blini et al. (in press).	Still in press.
5.	Please provide volume and page number for reference Nijboer et al. (2014).	On line paper only

6. Reference Rossetti et al. (2017) was provided in the reference list; however, this was not mentioned or cited in the manuscript. As a rule, if a citation is present in the text, then it should be present in the list. Please provide the location of where to insert the reference citation in the main body text.

I've deleted it.

uncorrected proof