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What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?

Abstract : In a  article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body that they represent. Here I approach this issue from the perspective of the debate on the admissible content of perception, appealing to the method of phenomenal contrast. After rejecting the myness hypothesis, I criticize alternative accounts of the contrast in somatosensory, cognitive, and agentive terms. I conclude that the phenomenology of ownership consists in the affective awareness of the unique significance of the body for survival.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, December 2, 2020 - 12:36:02 PM
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Frédérique de Vignemont. What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Cambridge Journals, 2020, 6 (1), pp.117-137. ⟨10.1017/apa.2019.34⟩. ⟨ijn_03035751⟩



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