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Non-human Metacognition

Abstract : There is as yet no consensus about what "metacognition" requires, and in particular, on how essential it is for genuine metacognition to include the declarative form of awareness that humans seem to enjoy when they "think that they think". Some primates, rodents, and pigeons seem to be able to reliably predict or evaluate their own performance in perceptual or memorial tasks. Are these abilities merely based on predicted reward, or do they rely on metarepresentations of first-order states? Psychological data and neuroscientific evidence, however, suggest that neither of these views is correct. Nonhuman metacognition seems to be rather based on activity-dependent information, i.e., on the dynamic aspects of the mind-brain activation that a given task triggers. On the view defended below, non-humans contextually experience their perceptual or memorial dispositions, as humans do, in feeling-based evaluative attitudes called "affordance sensings".
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Submitted on : Wednesday, December 2, 2020 - 3:57:22 PM
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Joëlle Proust. Non-human Metacognition. C. Andrews; J. Beck. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, pp.142-153, 2017. ⟨ijn_03036307⟩



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